The case for pre-emptive defence
Vessel Impersonation Report
Tactical Cyber Intelligence Reporting
|First Seen||Subject Line Used||Malware Detections||Sending Email||Targets|
|May 18, 2020||RE: MT OCEAN CHEMIST / V.2004B / DUE SINGAPORE OR TANGJUNG PELEPAS,\r\n MALAYSIA FOR LOADING - AGENT APPOINTMENT||Trojan:Win32/Wacatac.C!ml||"Platinum Marine Bunker Co. Ltd." email@example.com||Targets Not Disclosed|
|May 18, 2020||FW: Damaged Cargo: MV. SEASPAN CHIWAN - BL. LHV2217356 (IV35) / IVORY\n COAST- JLB 3/4133/20.||Trojan:Win32/Wacatac.C!ml||JLB MARSEILLE firstname.lastname@example.org||Targets Not Disclosed|
|May 19, 2020||RFQ/ORDER #2020518 FROM China Merchants Port Holdings Co.Ltd||Trojan:Win32/Wacatac.C!ml||IlPFq24gRMOpbcOtbmcgKOWtq+W+t+aYjiki = email@example.comfirstname.lastname@example.org|
|May 19, 2020||MAERSK LINE SHIPMENT DOCUMENT||Trojan:Win32/Occamy.AA||MAERSK LINE email@example.com||maersk firstname.lastname@example.org|
|May 19, 2020||CARGO ARRIVAL NOTICE-Express BL: 200101092/0102||Trojan:Win32/Wacatac.Cemail@example.comfirstname.lastname@example.org|
|May 20, 2020||FW: MT Pavino / Load Port PD/A Crude Benzene + Bunker Request||Trojan:Script/Wacatac.C!ml||Sun Xu Qing email@example.com||Targets Not Disclosed|
|May 20, 2020||RE: ADJUSTMENT // PRE ALERT AT INDONESIA \"NYK FUJI V.084S\" LCL TO JKT YGLNGO004466 // YIF-FW-19004159/||PWS:Win32/Fareit.A!MTB||PT. YAMATO INDONESIA FORWARDING Jakarta firstname.lastname@example.orgemail@example.com|
|May 20, 2020||M/V Ocean Adventure - Fittings for Rescue Boat Repair||HEUR:Exploit.MSOffice.Generic||li firstname.lastname@example.orgemail@example.com|
|May 20, 2020||Cash to Master - MV GOLDEN PEARL||HEUR:Exploit.MSOffice.Generic||TAT SING INTERNATIONAL LOGISTICS firstname.lastname@example.org||Targets Not Disclosed|
|May 20, 2020||Confidentiality Agreement Request : Structural Steel Materials /\r\n PE-105 / Dalma Gas Development Project / Package A (Offshore) / ADNOC||HEUR_RTFMALFORM||Carol Ramirez email@example.com||Targets Not Disclosed|
|May 20, 2020||Your Shipment has arrived - Maersk||Trojan:Win32/Occamy.C||"Maersk Notification firstname.lastname@example.org" email@example.com||Targets Not Disclosed|
|May 21, 2020||Payment for invoice #34689- 05x40\'HC Container Aqaba - WWS/||Trojan:Win32/Wacatac.C!ml||Inna Reznik firstname.lastname@example.orgemail@example.com|
|May 21, 2020||COSCO SHIPPING LINES - 7223942580 - Document Shipping Instruction/BL||Trojan:Win32/Pwsteal.Q!bit||COSCO SHANGHAI SHIP MANAGEMENT CO., LTD firstname.lastname@example.orgemail@example.com|
|May 21, 2020||Amended P.O 28602 / Hebei Ocean||HEUR:Backdoor.Win32.Androm.gen||"Hebei Ocean Shipping Agency Ltd." firstname.lastname@example.org||Targets Not Disclosed|
|May 21, 2020||DHL Global Forwarding (China) Co., Ltd. CARGO RECEIPT||Trojan:Win32/Wacatac.C!ml||DHL Express Worldwide||Targets Not Disclosed|
|May 22, 2020||RE: REQUEST FOR QUOTATION - M.V. OMNI TIGRIS DRY DOCKING||Trojan:Win32/Sonbokli.A!cl||SHAIFFUL RIDZUAN email@example.com||Targets Not Disclosed|
In the above collection, we see malicious actors attempting to use vessel names to try to spoof companies in the maritime supply chain. This week we observed a wide variety of maritime-related subject lines. Some of the new vessel names used this week include “MT Pavino” and “MV GOLDEN PEARL” among others.
Analysts observed subject line “M/V Ocean Adventure – Fittings for Rescue Boat Repair” being used in a malicious email this week. The malware contained in this email is one of the most common pieces of malware observed by analysts across all industries.
The email sender is listed as “li <firstname.lastname@example.org>.” The sending email address does not appear to be registered to any legitimate company, and the domain (eliteomar[.]com) is listed on a defacement website indicating that the webhost was hacked by an Indonesian hacking team – “Indonesian Cyber Jawa”. The email signature shows the sender’s name is “Kelvin Li” and lists two maritime companies – ATN Marine and Trading Co., LTD & ARC Marine Services Co.,LTD. Notably, the mailing address listed in his signature is not registered to either company. A more legitimate email email@example.com is listed in the signature as well so it is unclear why this user would be sending emails from the “firstname.lastname@example.org” address.
The targeted recipient of this email is an International Technical Marine Sales agent for Fuji Trading (Marine) B.V. which is a “world leader in marine supply” located in The Netherlands. There is no clear connection between Fuji Trading (Marine) B.V. and ATN or ARC Marine. Hans’ email does not appear to be listed publicly anywhere online.
The malware in this email is contained in a malicious .doc attachment titled “103 SWIFT 13-05-20.doc.” When opened, the victim would activate HEUR:Exploit.MSOffice.Generic malware. This malware exploits a MS Office memory corruption vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882), often downloading a malicious file disguised as an audio driver (%Application Data%\audiodrvrdll.exe).
Analysts observed another malicious email containing the subject line used last week, “Amended P.O 28602 / Hebei Ocean.” The email was sent from “Hebei Ocean Shipping Agency Ltd.<email@example.com>.”
The sender email domain appears to be registered to the Hebei Ocean Shipping Agency domain “hoscoagency.com.” As there is no company website. Analysts are unable to verify the legitimacy of the sending domain but have low confidence that the domain is in fact owned by the shipping agency. The sending email address was associated with a separate malicious email posted on a spam-email website and does not appear to be a deliverable email address.
The targets were not disclosed in this email making it difficult to conclude the attackers intentions, but the malicious file attachment:
“PURCHASE ORDER 28602.gz” contains HEUR:Backdoor.Win32.Androm.gen” malware. The file contains backdoor malware which makes registry and file changes to gain a foothold on the victim’s device. Kaspersky claims that approximately 25% of this malware’s victims are in either Germany or Russia.
These analytical results illustrate how a recipient could be fooled into opening an infected email. Doing so could cause the recipient to become an infected member of the maritime supply chain and thus possibly infect victim vessels, port facilities and/or shore companies in the marine, agricultural, and other industries with additional malware.
Our Experts Say
Weekly Maritime Watchlist
Top 5 Malicious Maritime Subject Lines
The more convincing an email appears, the greater the chance employees will fall for a scam. To address this residual risk, software-based protection should be treated as one constituent of a wider strategy that also encompasses the human-element as well as organizational workflows and procedures.
It is imperative to:
- Train all levels of the marine supply chain to realize they are under constant cyber-attack.
- Stress maintaining constant attention to real-world cyber consequences of careless cyber practices or general inattentiveness.
- Provide practical guidance on how to look for a potential phishing attempt.
- Use direct communication to verify emails and supply chain email communication.
- Use Red Sky Alliance RedXray proactive support, our Vessel impersonation information and use the Maritime Black Lists to proactively block cyber attacks from identified malicious actors.