The case for pre-emptive defence
Vessel Impersonation Report
Tactical Cyber Intelligence Reporting
|First Seen||Subject Line Used||Malware Detections||Sending Email||Targets|
|May 9, 2020||RE: MV TBN T e-PDA||Trojan:Win32/Occamy.C||Patty Chao firstname.lastname@example.orgemail@example.com|
|May 9, 2020||RE: HBL with vessel details||Trojan:Win32/Wacatac.Dfirstname.lastname@example.orgemail@example.com|
|May 9, 2020||VSL: ABALONE, QUOTATION: ABL-S205044A, VENDOR: JONGHAP MARITIME INC||Exploit:O97M/CVE-2017-11882.ARJ!MTB||"Shenzhen Cloud Sailing Co., Ltd"firstname.lastname@example.orgemail@example.com|
|May 9, 2020||DHL Global Forwarding (China) Co., Ltd. CARGO RECEIPT,\n INVOICE AVAILABILITY NOTIFICATION: 200507473||Trojan:Win32/Wacatac.D!ml||Mandy Chau (DHL HK) firstname.lastname@example.orgemail@example.com|
|May 11, 2020||// SHIPMENT ADVISE // SEA SHIPMENT/28CTNS HB/L # DAC0024943 COB:\r\n 11-MAY-2020||Trojan:Win32/Sonbokli.A!cl||Ajit Lund firstname.lastname@example.orgemail@example.com|
|May 11, 2020||Notice of Arrival for MSC B/L :MEDUG3735396/MSC CARLA 3/HC009A||PWS:Win32/Fareit!MTB||ID547-MSC IDJKT IMPORT INVOICE firstname.lastname@example.org||Targets Not Disclosed|
|May 11, 2020||RE: ADJUSTMENT // PRE ALERT AT INDONESIA \"NYK FUJI V.084S\" LCL TO JKT YGLNGO004466 // YIF-FW-19004159/||Trojan:Win32/Skeeyah.A!rfn||Jakarta email@example.com PT. YAMATO INDONESIA FORWARDINGfirstname.lastname@example.org|
|May 12, 2020||RFQ - SEA FAITH - ANCHOR||Trojan:Win32/Wacatac.C!ml||Purchase Dept email@example.comfirstname.lastname@example.org|
|May 12, 2020||MV SEAVENUS-PDA||Exploit:O97M/CVE-2017-11882.L||Ummer Ali email@example.comfirstname.lastname@example.org|
|May 14, 2020||RFQ For Supply of Container 5x40ft_0320||Trojan:Win32/Wacatac.C!ml||Sabrina Yong email@example.comfirstname.lastname@example.org|
|May 14, 2020||RE: M/T ALPHA MARINE - No.2 Cargo Pump Elec. Motor Overhaul||Trojan:Win32/Occamy.AA||"JINSAN MARINE MANAGEMENT CO.,LTD" email@example.com||Targets Not Disclosed|
In the above collection, we see malicious actors attempting to use vessel names to try to spoof companies in the maritime supply chain. This week we observed a large percentage of these malicious emails attempting to deliver Windows password stealing trojan malware. Some of the new vessel names used this week include “SEA FAITH” and “MSC CARLA,” among others.
Analysts observed another malicious email containing the subject line “// SHIPMENT ADVISE // SEA SHIPMENT/28CTNS HB/L # DAC0024943 COB: 11-MAY-2020.” The email is disguised as a bill of lading for an unnamed shipment from the Seahorse Ship Agencies PVT. LTD. In this case the email appears to have been sent from a dealership portal instead of being sent through a standard email client such as Outlook or Apple Mail.
The sender “Ajit Lund” is sending the message from “mst-dealer.com” but signs the message body with a logo from the Seahorse Ship Agencies PVT. LTD. Company. Also, mail[.]mst-dealer[.]com appears to be a login portal with a Mazda logo on the main page. The email message is generic enough to be used as a template and does not appear to name a particular ship or shipment.
The email recipient in this case is “firstname.lastname@example.org.” The domain shasha[.]com is registered to Shasha Denims LTD. in Bangladesh. There is one marketing executive identified with the first name of Shidul, but it is unclear if this is the same employee being targeted in this email.
The malicious email attachment filename is “ETA_BILL_OF_LADING.gz” indicating the file is a .gzip filetype. Upon opening the file, the victim would activate Trojan:Win32/Sonbokli.A!cl malware. This variant of malware uses Microsoft Powershell to download a malicious .otf file from a malicious command and control server.
Analysts observed another malicious email containing the subject line used last week, “RE: M/T ALPHA MARINE – No.2 Cargo Pump Elec. Motor Overhaul.” The email was sent from “JINSAN MARINE MANAGEMENT CO., LTD.” JINSAN Marine Management claims to be one of the world’s top twenty marine suppliers and engine parts sales agents of Hyundai Engine and Marine Machinery since 2010.
The sending domain does indeed appear to be registered to JINSAN Marine, so it is unclear if the account has been taken over by bad actors to spread malware, or if the sender is knowingly sending malware. It is common for attackers to spread malware by impersonating a victim from a previous cyber-attack. Although the recipients are undisclosed, analysts believe with medium confidence that the parties being targeted have some financial/business investment in the Motor Tanker (M/T) Alpha Marine.
The email contains a malicious .xlsx Excel spreadsheet attachment labeled “EPDA – MT ALPHA MARINE.xlsx.” The attachment contains Trojan:Win32/Occamy.AA malware which can be used to exfiltrate and steal sensitive data from the victim’s machine. This malware can also be used to remotely install/activate ransomware.
Our Experts Say
Weekly Maritime Watchlist
Top 5 Malicious Maritime Subject Lines
The more convincing an email appears, the greater the chance employees will fall for a scam. To address this residual risk, software-based protection should be treated as one constituent of a wider strategy that also encompasses the human-element as well as organizational workflows and procedures.
It is imperative to:
- Train all levels of the marine supply chain to realize they are under constant cyber-attack.
- Stress maintaining constant attention to real-world cyber consequences of careless cyber practices or general inattentiveness.
- Provide practical guidance on how to look for a potential phishing attempt.
- Use direct communication to verify emails and supply chain email communication.
- Use Red Sky Alliance RedXray proactive support, our Vessel impersonation information and use the Maritime Black Lists to proactively block cyber attacks from identified malicious actors.